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Illinois Real Estate Brokers: The Duties of
Disclosure and Accuracy
Paul Meyer*
Traditionally, in Illinois, disappointed real estate purchasers
were able to impose liability on real estate brokers' only for express
statements that rose to the level of common law intentional fraud.2
However, with the erosion of the doctrine of caveat emptor3 and a
new awareness of the reliance that purchasers place on the experi-
ence and advice of brokers, the Illinois courts and the Illinois legis-
lature have been receptive to increasing brokers' duties to
prospective purchasers. Taking advantage of such a pro-consumer
environment, disappointed purchasers and frustrated prospective
purchasers have tested relatively new theories of liability including
fraudulent concealment, negligent misrepresentation, and viola-
tions of the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act
("Consumer Fraud Act").4 These relatively new theories seek to
impose liability on brokers for either: (1) express statements alleg-
* Associate at Mayer, Brown & Platt, Chicago, Illinois; B.A., 1984, Creighton Uni-
versity; J.D., 1987, University of Notre Dame.
1. In Illinois, a broker is statutorily defined as "an individual, partnership or corpora-
tion, other than a real estate salesperson, who for another and for compensation ... (sells,
offers to sell, lists, or a]ssists or directs in the negotiation of any transaction intended to
result in the sale, exchange, leasing or rental of real estate." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111,
para. 5804(4) (1989). The Real Estate License Act of 1983 is codified at ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 11, paras. 5801-5836.24 (1989).
2. See, e.g., Pustelniak v. Vilimas, 185 N.E. 611 (11. 1933) (broker intentionally mis-
represented the value of a gas station to prospective purchaser).
3. Caveat emptor means "[l]et the buyer beware. This maxim summarizes the rule
that a purchaser must examine, judge, and test for himself." BLACK'S LAW DIcrIONARY
222 (6th ed. 1990); see also Reimer v. Leshtz, 414 N.E.2d 114, 117 (I11. App. Ct. 1980)
("the modern trend in the law is away from a strict application of the rule of caveat
emptor"); Posner v. Davis, 395 N.E.2d 133, 137 (I11. App. Ct. 1979) ("the modem trend
in the law regarding the sale of a home is away from strict adherence to the doctrine of
caveat emptor").
4. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, paras. 261-272 (1989). The Consumer Fraud Act
incorporates, by reference, the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act, ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 121 1/2, paras. 311-317 (1989), and the Trade Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121 1/2,
para. 262 (1989).
Disappointed purchasers also sought to impose liability under the Real Estate License
Act of 1983, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111, paras. 5801-5836.24 (1989), and its predecessor,
the Real Estate Brokers and Salesmen License Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 11, paras. 5701-
5743, repealed by 1983 ILL. LAWS 1700, 1728 (effective Jan. 1, 1984). The Illinois
Supreme Court, in Sawyer Realty Group, Inc. v. Jarvis Corp., 432 N.E.2d 849, 852-53
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edly made in violation of the broker's duty of accuracy; or (2) the
broker's silence in failing to disclose material facts when such si-
lence violates the broker's duty of disclosure. The dearth of gui-
dance by the Illinois Supreme Court, however, has produced
uncertainty regarding the scope of these recently created duties of
accuracy and disclosure.
This Article examines both the scope and the appropriateness of
these duties. In particular, this Article will (1) address the broker's
common law and statutory obligations to disclose material facts to
the purchaser, and (2) analyze the broker's common law and statu-
tory obligations to confirm the accuracy of information conveyed
to the purchaser, both when the broker acts as a conduit for the
seller and when the broker speaks independently of the seller.
Part I addresses the broker's common law duties of disclosure
and accuracy as developed in actions for fraudulent concealment
and negligent misrepresentation. Part II discusses the broker's
statutory duties of disclosure and accuracy as governed by the
Consumer Fraud Act.5 Part III summarizes the current status of a
broker's common law and statutory obligations, and Part IV pro-
vides projections and recommendations for the future development
of these obligations. This Article concludes that although purchas-
ers need to be protected from misplaced reliance and from decep-
tive broker conduct that does not rise to the level of common law
intentional fraud, a strict, literal application of the broker's statu-
tory obligations is an unwarranted and inappropriate response to
both problems. In fact, the expanded common law obligations
provide equitable and adequate methods to protect purchasers
from a range of broker misconduct. Moreover, the problem of pur-
chasers' misplaced reliance should be properly redressed with con-
sumer education.
(Ill. 1982), found that a private right of action for damages existed under the Brokers
Licensing Act.
After Sawyer, however, the Illinois legislature amended the Real Estate License Act of
1983 to provide that "[n]othing in this Act shall be construed to grant to any person a
private right of action for damages or to enforce the provisions of this Act or the rules or
regulations issued under this Act." See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111, para. 5832 (1989). This
amendment prevents individuals from relying upon the Real Estate License Act of 1983
for the existence of statutory obligations and forces individuals to turn to other statutory
or common law obligations. See Stefani v. Baird & Warner, Inc., 510 N.E.2d 65, 70 (11.
App. Ct.) ("Based on the [amendment], therefore, we hold that plaintiffs' alleged cause of
action pursuant to the Real Estate License Act and r .. .u the epart-
..me -Z if i e ion ana E ducation was barred and properly dismissed.") appeal denied,
515 N.E.2d 172 (Ill. 1987). For a further discussion of claims brought under the Brokers
Licensing Act, see infra notes 17, 19, 43 and accompanying text.
5. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, paras. 261-272 (1989).
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Illinois Real Estate Broker Duties
I. COMMON LAW ACTIONS IMPOSING BROKER LIABILITY
Illinois brokers historically were liable only for express state-
ments that rose to the level of intentional fraud. Within the past
ten years, however, real estate purchasers increasingly have tried to
hold brokers liable for both fraudulent concealment and negligent
misrepresentation. Accordingly, this section discusses the Illinois
courts' development of these two common law actions and the re-
spective duties they impose on brokers.
A. Fraudulent Concealment and the Duty to Disclose
Liability for fraud will be imposed if a plaintiff proves the
following:
a false statement of material fact was made, that the party mak-
ing the statement knew or believed it to be untrue, that the party
to whom the statement was made had a right to rely on it and did
so, that the statement was made for the purpose of inducing the
other party to act, and that reliance by the person to whom the
statement was made led to his injury.6
Although the existence of an affirmatively egregious statement is a
crucial element of common law fraud, a plaintiff may also bring an
action for fraud when a defendant remains silent. Indeed, fraud
can be based not only upon egregious statements, but also upon
intentional concealment7 and upon the failure to speak when there
is a duty to do so. 8 Rather than focusing on the existence of an
egregious statement, as numerous authors9 and court decisions1"
6. Redarowicz v. Ohlendorf, 441 N.E.2d 324, 331 (Ill. 1982); see also Salisbury v.
Chapman Realty, 465 N.E.2d 127, 132 (111. App. Ct. 1984) (finding a sufficient allegation
of fraud when broker failed to deliver on promise to convey good title to the property at a
future date).
7. See Obermaier v. Obermaier, 470 N.E.2d 1047, 1051 (111. App. Ct. 1984) ("Actual
fraud is an intentional misrepresentation or intentional concealment, by one party, of a
material fact which is relied on to the detriment of another party."); see also Zimmerman
v. Northfield Real Estate, Inc., 510 N.E.2d 409, 413 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986) ("Intentional
concealment of a material fact is the equivalent of a false statement of material fact.").
8. See Zimmerman, 510 N.E.2d at 413 ("Where a person has a duty to speak, his
failure to disclose material information constitutes fraudulent concealment."); Salisbury,
465 N.E.2d at 132 ("Where a person has a duty to speak, his failure to disclose material
information is equivalent to a fraudulent concealment.").
9. See Craig A. Peterson, Tort Claims by Real Estate Purchasers Against Sellers and
Brokers: Current Illinois Common Law and Statutory Strategies, 1983 S. ILL. U. L.J. 161
(discussing liability of brokers for common law fraud and negligent misrepresentation);
David F. Black, Recovery for Defects in the Sale of Used Homes, 64 CHi. B. REC. 118
(1982) (discussing liability of brokers for negligent misrepresentation); James S. Sinclair,
The Duty of the Broker to Purchasers and Prospective Purchasers of Real Property in Illi-
nois, 69 ILL. B.J. 260 (1981) (discussing liability of brokers for breach of fiduciary duty).
10. See cases cited supra note 6.
19921
Loyola University Law Journal
have, or on conduct that constitutes intentional concealment, this
Article will focus primarily on the existence and scope of the duty
to disclose material facts.
The Illinois cases examining the broker's duty to disclose mate-
rial facts in a fraud action focus on two main areas of disclosure. "
The first area concerns a broker's personal interest in the property
and the second deals with defects in the condition of the property.
1. Personal Interest
The Illinois Supreme Court has decided two cases addressing the
broker's common law duty to disclose personal interest. The first
was Fish v. Teninga,12 decided in 1928. In Fish, the plaintiff alleged
that the broker fraudulently failed to disclose his interest in
purchasing the same property that the plaintiff desired to
purchase. 3  Finding the broker not liable, the Fish court estab-
lished the rule that a "real estate broker is under no duty to dis-
close material facts known to him regarding property concerning
which inquiry is made of him" 14 unless a principal-agent relation-
ship is established between the purchaser and the broker. 5
The rule announced in Fish stood for fifty-four years until the
Illinois Supreme Court revisited the issue in Sawyer Realty Group,
Inc. v. Jarvis Corp. ' 6 In Sawyer, the plaintiff sued the brokers
under the Real Estate Brokers and Salesmen License Act ("Bro-
11. See infra notes 12-44 and accompanying text. But see Bliesener v. Baird &
Warner, Inc., 232 N.E.2d 13, 15 (Ill. App. Ct. 1967) (finding that the broker, having
knowledge of its principal's inability to perform the terms of a lease, owed a duty to the
plaintiff to disclose information regarding the principal's inability to perform).
12. 161 N.E. 515 (Ill. 1928).
13. Id. at 516. The plaintiff sought to impose a constructive trust after the broker
acquired the property, but the court refused to impose the trust. Id. at 516-18.
14. Id. at 519.
15. Id. For cases discussing the existence of a principal-agent relationship, see Duffy
v. Setchell, 347 N.E.2d 218, 221 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976) ("If a buyer requests a broker's
assistance in obtaining a particular piece of property, the broker may be held to be the
buyer's agent for that transaction.") and Stefani v. Baird & Warner, Inc., 510 N.E.2d 65,
69 (Ill. App. Ct.), appeal denied, 515 N.E.2d 172 (Ill. 1987). The Stefani court observed:
Although, as defendant argues, plaintiffs did not initially contact [defendant] to
purchase a particular piece of property on their behalf, we believe that a question
of fact existed as to whether [defendant's] later representation of plaintiffs, once
they made an offer to purchase the Harris property, and her participation in the
ensuing negotiations between plaintiffs and Harris, rose to the level of employ-
ment of defendant as an agent, during that time, to Durchas, nntrti-1-p!. !cC;t
p;-opm,iy, i.e., he Hams property.
Id. The requirement of a principal-agent relationship is separate from determining
whether such a relationship exists.
16. 432 N.E.2d 849 (Ill. 1982).
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kers Licensing Act") 17 for the brokers' failure to disclose their in-
terest in purchasing property that they listed for sale.'" The
Sawyer court found that a statutory duty of disclosure existed
under the Brokers Licensing Act19 and bolstered its conclusion by
finding that a separate duty of disclosure existed under the com-
mon law.2" Recognizing a common law duty of disclosure, the
Sawyer court implicitly overruled Fish announcing that it was "no
longer viable" to impose a duty to disclose material facts only in
the presence of a principal-agent fiduciary relationship.2' Instead,
relying upon the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals's holding in Funk
v. Tifft,22 the Sawyer court held that "[rneal estate brokers occupy a
position of trust with respect to the purchasers with whom they are
negotiating. Brokers owe a corresponding duty to exercise good
faith and disclose any personal interest they have in property they
list for sale."' 23 The Sawyer holding represents the current state of
17. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111, paras. 5701-5743 (repealed 1984). The Brokers Licens-
ing Act was repealed, 1983 ILL. LAWS 1700, 1728 (effective Jan. 1, 1984), and replaced
by the Real Estate License Act of 1983, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111, paras. 5801-5836.24
(1989). For a discussion of the Illinois legislature's removal of a private right of action
from the Brokers Licensing Act, see supra note 4 and infra note 43.
18. Sawyer, 432 N.E.2d at 850.
19. The Sawyer court found that a corresponding duty of disclosure existed under
rules V(A) and (C) promulgated by the Department of Registration and Education pur-
suant to the Brokers Licensing Act. Id. at 851-52. The rules, in pertinent part, state:
V. Disclosure
(A) A registrant shall disclose to any and all purchasers, prospective pur-
chasers .... any and all material knowledge he may have as soon as it may be
practical for him so to do. This rule shall not be construed to require a regis-
trant to violate his duties under the laws of agency.
(C) A registrant shall disclose to all parties in any transaction,... any and
all interest he or it does or may have . . . in the real estate constituting the
subject matter thereof ....
Id. at 851 (quoting DEPARTMENT OF REGISTRATION AND EDUCATION, RULES AND
REGULATIONS PROMULGATED FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE REAL ESTATE BRO-
KERS AND SALESMEN LICENSE ACT V(A), (C) (rev. ed. 1979)). The Sawyer court, find-
ing that a private right of action existed under the Brokers Licensing Act, concluded that
the Illinois legislature intended for these rules to be enforced through private litigation.
Id. at 854-55.
20. Id. at 852.
21. Id.
22. 515 F.2d 23 (9th Cir. 1975).
23. Sawyer, 432 N.E.2d at 852 (citing Funk, 515 F.2d at 25). The Sawyer court's
reliance upon Funk, however, is suspect. It is questionable whether the Ninth Circuit
correctly reasoned that a fiduciary duty of disclosure exists absent a principal-agent rela-
tionship.
In Funk, the plaintiffs, alleging that the brokers breached their fiduciary duties by not
disclosing their interest in bidding upon and purchasing the same property that the plain-
tiffs had bid on through the brokers, sought to impose a constructive trust on the prop-
erty. Funk, 515 F.2d at 25. The Ninth Circuit, relying upon case law from various
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Illinois common law regarding the broker's duty to disclose per-
sonal interest. 24 Thus, if a broker remains silent about his or her
personal interest, that silence, in light of the Sawyer good faith
duty of disclosure, may constitute fraudulent concealment and
may subject the broker to liability.
2. Property Condition
As with broker liability for non-disclosure of a personal interest,
broker liability for non-disclosure of property defects, prior to Saw-
yer, was limited to instances in which the purchaser could establish
either fraudulent statements, active concealment,25 or that a princi-
pal-agent relationship with the broker existed.26 The question
jurisdictions, found that a fiduciary relationship existed between the plaintiff and the bro-
kers, that the brokers breached their fiduciary duties, and that the imposition of a con-
structive trust was the proper remedy for such a breach. Id. at 25-26. The court found
that the fiduciary relationship was formed "[w]hen a real estate broker acts as an interme-
diary between a seller and a prospective buyer." Id. at 25. However, by not exploring
what it means to "act as an intermediary" in order to create a fiduciary relationship and
by relying upon cases that found a breach of a fiduciary duty only after finding the exist-
ence of a principal-agent relationship, the Ninth Circuit may have reasoned incorrectly
that a broker owes a fiduciary duty of disclosure to a prospective purchaser absent a
principal-agent relationship. Id. at 28 (Wright, J., dissenting). Thus, because of the
Ninth Circuit's questionable reasoning in Funk, the Sawyer court's reliance on Funk in
overruling Fish may have been inappropriate. See Note, Real Estate Brokers' Duties to
Prospective Purchasers-Funk v. Tifft, 1976 B.Y.U. L. REv. 513 (discussing the Funk
court's disclosure requirement).
24. See, e.g., Seligman v. First Nat'l Invs., Inc., 540 N.E.2d 1057 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989).
The Seligman court, addressing an action for a violation of the Consumer Fraud Act,
cited Sawyer for the proposition that brokers have a "duty to exercise good faith and to
disclose any personal interest in property they list for sale." Id. at 1064.
25. One of the first cases to consider a broker's duty to disclose defects in the physical
condition of property listed for sale was Russow v. Bobola, 277 N.E.2d 769 (Ill. App. Ct.
1972). In Russow, the plaintiffs brought suit against the individual salesperson, the bro-
ker, the broker's employer, and the sellers alleging that each of them, by failing to dis-
close basement flooding of which they had knowledge, fraudulently concealed material
information. Id at 770-71. The court found that the sellers' conduct of washing and
painting the basement walls as well as the sellers' incomplete and incorrect responses to
plaintiffs' questions presented sufficient evidence of active concealment. Id. at 771-72.
The Russow court made no statement regarding the broker's knowledge of the property
defect, but held that the plaintiffs failed to present sufficient evidence to require the bro-
ker to defend a fraud charge absent evidence demonstrating that the broker made fraudu-
lent statements or actively concealed the evidence of flooding. Id. at 772. The court
affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the plaintiff's action against the broker. Id. The
Russow court found that the broker "made no statement regarding the flooding or drain-
age of the house, and took no active steps to conceal the situation," that the brokerage
company did not make "any statement as to flooding or drainage," and that the salesper-
son's "silence fell far short of active coneppl._n.." rd. TIh, Ryuxow court noted that
ii "silence in a business transaction does not generally amount to fraud" and thus
refused to find that the broker had a duty of disclosure that could be breached by silence.
Id. at 771.
26. In Blocklinger v. Schlegel, 374 N.E.2d 491, 492 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978), the plaintiff
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post-Sawyer was whether the broker's common law "duty of good
faith" required disclosure, even absent a principal-agent relation-
ship, not only of a broker's personal interest in property but also of
property defects.
This question was answered in the affirmative by Munjal v. Baird
& Warner, Inc. 27 and Zimmerman v. Northfield Real Estate, Inc. ,2s
when both held that Sawyer's common law "duty of good faith"
also imposes a duty upon the broker to disclose material property
defects even in the absence of a principal-agent relationship. How-
ever, both courts qualified the scope of the duty to disclose by
holding that the duty only arises if a broker has knowledge of the
material property defects.29
In Munjal, the plaintiffs encountered severe flooding in the home
they purchased.30 They sued the seller, the broker, and the broker-
age company, alleging both common law fraud and a violation of
the Consumer Fraud Act. 3' After the trial court found for the
plaintiffs, 32 the appellate court sustained the jury's finding against
the sellers, but reversed the verdict against the broker.33 The court
acknowledged, pursuant to Sawyer, that brokers owe prospective
purchasers a duty of good faith absent a principal-agent relation-
ship.34 However, the court found that the broker's express state-
ment,35 although false, did not rise to the level of fraud.36 The
broker brought a specific performance suit against the defendant sellers when the sellers
refused to perform under a real estate sales contract. The sellers acknowledged the exist-
ence of the contract, but sought rescission because the contract terms required a sale to
the plaintiff for a below-market price. Id. The sellers alleged that the plaintiff's use of a
multiple listing service to discover the property made him their sub-agent. Id. at 493.
Accordingly, the broker's status as the seller's sub-agent created a fiduciary duty to dis-
close his occupation as a realtor and his particular expertise as to land values. Id. The
court, however, rejected the sellers' argument and held that the plaintiff's use of a multi-
ple listing service did not make him a sub-agent of the defendants. Id. Relying on the
Fish decision, the Blocklinger court found that "[in the absence of an agency relation-
ship[,] a fiduciary duty of disclosure did not exist." Id.
27. 485 N.E.2d 855 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985).
28. 510 N.E.2d 409 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986).
29. Id. at 413; Munjal, 485 N.E.2d at 864; cf Easton v. Strassburger, 199 Cal. Rptr.
383, 390 (Ct. App. 1984) (holding that brokers have an "affirmative duty to conduct a
reasonably competent and diligent inspection of the residential property listed for sale
and to disclose to prospective purchasers all facts materially affecting the value or desira-
bility of the property that such an investigation would reveal").
30. Munjal, 485 N.E.2d at 860.
31. Id. at 858. For a discussion of the alleged violation of the Consumer Fraud Act,
see infra notes 117-21 and accompanying text.
32. Munjal, 485 N.E.2d at 861.
33. Id. at 867.
34. Id. at 863.
35. When asked by the purchaser about evidence of water in the basement, the broker
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court accepted the broker's testimony that he "was not aware" of
the falsity of the statement nor was the false statement made "in-
tentionally or in culpable ignorance of the truth. '3 7 Accordingly,
Munjal may be construed as a qualification of Sawyer's duty of
good faith, in that, under Munjal, the broker's duty is to disclose
known material defects.38
Further, in Zimmerman v. Northfield Real Estate, Inc.,3 the
court confirmed the Munjal court's qualification of Sawyer, hold-
ing that the duty of disclosure inherent in the Sawyer duty of good
faith only applies to material information of which the broker has
knowledge.' The Zimmerman court found that the plaintiffs'
complaint "sufficiently alleged that the brokers had a duty to speak
regarding material information of which they had knowledge."41
Furthermore, the court held that the brokers' silence as to those
known facts, in light of the duty of disclosure, "may constitute
fraudulent concealment of material facts."42 The Zimmerman
court premised its holding not only on an implied duty of disclo-
sure in the Brokers Licensing Act,43 but also on the duty of disclo-
told the purchaser that the water in the basement was "caused by a leaky check valve on
the sump pump," as the broker had been told by the seller. Id. at 859.
36. Id. at 863-64.
37. Id. at 863.
38. Arguably then, the Russow decision, see supra note 25, allowing brokers to re-
main silent in light of known defects, is no longer controlling.
39. 510 N.E.2d 409 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986).
40. Id. at 413.
41. Id. (emphasis added).
42. Id.
43. Id. (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111, paras. 5701-5743 (repealed 1984)). In con-
cluding that the statutory duty contained in the Brokers Licensing Act could be the basis
for a common law fraud claim, the Zimmerman court relied upon the Sawyer court's
holding that a private right of action existed under the Act and that the Act imposed
upon brokers a duty to disclose material facts. Id.; see also Salisbury v. Chapman Realty,
465 N.E.2d 127, 132 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984) ("[The defendant] had a duty to disclose mate-
rial facts under the Real Estate Brokers and Salesmen License Act .... Therefore, [the
defendant's] silence may constitute a fraudulent concealment of a material fact.").
During the pendency of Zimmerman, however, the Illinois legislature repealed the
Brokers Licensing Act and replaced it with the Real Estate License Act of 1983. See
supra notes 4, 17, and 19. Thus the legislature effectively overruled this aspect of the
Zimmerman holding.
By amending § 5832 of the Real Estate License Act of 1983 to specifically remove a
private right of action, the Illinois legislature may have intended to prevent a plaintiff
from using the statutory duty of disclosure as the basis for a common law fraudulent
concealment action. Indeed, prior to the Sawyer court's creation of a private right of
action under the Brokers Licensing Act, Illinois courts ivw_- iii5  fina a correla-
tion between ? . ,iuation and common law fraud. See, e.g., Blocklinger v. Schle-
gel, 374 N.E.2d 491, 493 (11. App. Ct. 1978). The Blocklinger court stated: "Further,
defendants' citation to the rules and regulations promulgated by the Department of Re-
gistration and Education of the State of Illinois pursuant to the Real Estate Brokers and
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sure necessary to comply with the duty of good faith imposed by
Sawyer."
B. Negligent Misrepresentation and the Duties of
Accuracy and Discovery
To prevail in an action for negligent misrepresentation, a pur-
chaser must establish the existence and subsequent breach of a pre-
existing duty owed to him by the broker.45 The broker's duty in a
negligent misrepresentation action is the duty of accuracy. As ex-
plained below, the duty of accuracy may arise out of specific fac-
tual situations or out of a broad, general obligation to prospective
buyers. In addition, inherent in the duty of accuracy is a duty of
discovery, the scope of which may vary depending on the type of
statement made by the broker.
1. Pre-Sawyer
Prior to Sawyer and the Illinois courts' adoption of the duty im-
posed by section 552 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts ("section
552")," there were only limited instances in which a disappointed
Salesmen Act and plaintiff's alleged breach of those rules do not establish the existence of
any fraud on plaintiff's part." Id. Thus, for this portion of the Zimmerman holding to
remain intact after the repeal of the Brokers Licensing Act, the Zimmerman holding
must be read as finding, consistent with Munjal, that the duty of disclosure incorporated
within the Sawyer duty of good faith is a common law duty to disclose only known mate-
rial defects.
44. Zimmerman, 510 N.E.2d at 413.
45. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 107, at 745-48 (5th ed. 1984). Generally, courts will find a duty when the defendant, in
the course of business, makes statements specifically for the benefit of the plaintiff. Id.
§ 107, at 747.
46. Section 552 provides:
(1) One who, in the course of his business profession or employment, or in
any other transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest, supplies false infor-
mation for the guidance of others in their business transactions, is subject to
liability for pecuniary loss caused to them by their justifiable reliance upon the
information, if he fails to exercise reasonable care or competence in obtaining or
communicating the information.
(2) Except as stated in Subsection (3), the liability stated in Subsection (1) is
limited to loss suffered
(a) by the person or one of a limited group of persons for whose benefit and
guidance he intends to supply the information or knows that the recipient in-
tends to supply it; and
(b) through reliance upon it in a transaction that he intends the information
to influence or knows that the recipient so intends or in a substantially similar
transaction.
(3) The liability of one who is under a public duty to give the information
extends to loss suffered by any of the class of persons for whose benefit the duty
is created, in any of the transactions in which it is intended to protect them.
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purchaser could establish the existence of a duty of accuracy.
In Lyons v. Christ Episcopal Church,47 one of the first cases to
consider an action against a broker for negligent misrepresentation,
the plaintiffs alleged that the broker, acting as a conduit for the
seller's false statement, was liable for negligent misrepresentation. 8
In finding that the plaintiffs failed to state a cause of action for
negligent misrepresentation, the Lyons court held that "a realtor
has no duty to prospective purchasers to independently substanti-
ate the representation of a disclosed seller unless [the realtor] is
aware of facts which tend to indicate that such representation is
false."4 9 Moreover, even if a duty of independent substantiation or
accuracy exists, "there is no breach unless the realtor could have
discovered the falsity of the representation by exercise of ordinary
care. '" Such a result, the court found, is consistent with comment
b of section 348 of the Restatement (Second) of Agency.5 Thus,
under Lyons, a duty of discovery is inherent in the duty of accu-
racy. Therefore, if a broker knows or should know, through the
exercise of ordinary care, that a seller's statements are incorrect,
then that broker's duty is to "independently substantiate" the
seller's statement.5 2 Thus, the broker must utilize the information
derived from investigation and speak accurately when acting as a
conduit for the seller's statement.
The next case to consider a claim against a broker for negligent
misrepresentation was Duhl v. Nash Realty, Inc. 53 Consistent with
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977).
47. 389 N.E.2d 623 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979).
48. Id. at 625. The trial court denied the broker's motion to dismiss the negligent
misrepresentation count for failure to state a cause of action. Id. The broker appealed
the denial of his motion, and the appellate court reversed. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. (emphasis added). In addition, the court stated: "It is fundamental that there
can be no liability in negligence without fault, the rule we follow would permit a finding
of fault only in situations where the real estate agent knew or should have known that the
representation might be false." Id.
51. Id. Comment b states:
An agent is not liable because of misrepresentations of the principal or of
another agent unless he knows or should know of them. He is not affected by
the knowledge of facts which the principal or another agent has and which, if
known to him, would cause his representations to be fraudulent. An agent who
makes untrue statements based upon the information given to him by the prin-
cipal is not liable because of the fact that the principal knew the information to
be untrue. An agent can properly rely upon statements of the principal to the
same extent as upon statements frnn any ct; rcputadie source.
R=.7Ti,1 MNT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 348 cmt. b (1958). For a discussion of the
meaning of "should know," see infra note 94.
52. Lyons, 389 N.E.2d at 626.
53. 429 N.E.2d 1267 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981).
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the Lyons decision, the Duhl court found that specific situations
may impose upon a broker a duty of accuracy toward a pur-
chaser.54 In Duhl, the plaintiffs, deciding how much to spend on a
new home, asked the defendant to appraise their existing home."5
The defendant provided an appraisal which subsequently proved to
be inaccurate.56 The Duhl court held that the plaintiffs' complaint
stated a cause of action for negligent misrepresentation. 57 The
court reasoned that the broker, having undertaken the task of ap-
praising the plaintiffs' property, had a duty to the plaintiffs to
speak correctly, "to use proper care in the performance of the
task,"5 " and "not to act negligently in rendering this service.""
The Duhl court buttressed its conclusion by reference to the lan-
guage of section 552 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts,6° since
the defendant broker, having undertaken the task of supplying in-
formation to the plaintiff, was subject to liability for harm caused
by the plaintiff's reliance upon the information if defendant failed
"to exercise proper care and competence in obtaining the informa-
tion."'6 1 Therefore, according to Duhl, if a broker affirmatively un-
dertakes an obligation to provide information to prospective
purchasers, the broker has a duty, consistent with the language of
section 552, to use care and competence in speaking correctly.
Thus, the result of the Lyons and Duhl decisions, at least prior to
Sawyer and the evolution of section 552 liability, was to provide
only limited instances in which a broker owed a prospective pur-
chaser a duty of accuracy. In particular, the duty of accuracy only
arose when a broker acted as a conduit for a seller's statement and
had knowledge of the statement's falsity, or when a broker affirma-
tively undertook an obligation to provide information.
As noted regarding fraudulent concealment actions, the Illinois
Supreme Court in Sawyer extended the duties of brokers to require
them to act "in good faith."' 62 The question after Sawyer was to
54. Id. at 1275.
55. Id. at 1270.
56. Id. at 1270-71.
57. Id. at 1275-76.
58. Id. at 1275 (citing WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 56 (4th ed. 1971)).
59. Id. at 1276.
60. Id. (citing Citizens Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Fischer, 214 N.E.2d 612, 617 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1966)). The Fischer court endorsed the American Law Institute's formulation of neg-
ligent misrepresentation as codified in the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 552. Id.
61. Id.
62. For a discussion of the scope of the Sawyer duty of good faith in the context of a
fraudulent concealment cause of action, see supra notes 16-24, 30-38 and accompanying
text.
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what extent did this good faith duty incorporate the duty of accu-
racy and its inherent duty of discovery in the context of negligent
misrepresentation actions?
2. Post-Sawyer
One of the first cases to utilize the Sawyer duty of good faith in
the context of negligent misrepresentation was Richmond v.
Blair.63 The Richmond court acknowledged that the existence of a
duty is a critical element of negligent misrepresentation 64 and cited
Sawyer for the proposition that realtors owe prospective purchasers
"a duty to exercise good faith in their dealings with such [purchas-
ers] even absent the existence of an agency relationship."6 The
Richmond court then held that "based on Sawyer,... an action for
negligent misrepresentation can lie against a realtor who negli-
gently makes a misrepresentation of a material fact."' 66 This duty
of accuracy, however, was expressed by the Richmond court as the
"duty . . . to be knowledgeable and accurate in giving [the pur-
chaser] information regarding the property. 67
The Richmond court went on to find that the duty to be knowl-
edgeable and accurate can be breached if a broker makes state-
ments negligently, that is, "without actual knowledge of their truth
or falsity."' 68 Thus, according to Richmond, the Sawyer duty of
good faith incorporates a stringent duty to be knowledgeable and
accurate, and this duty of accuracy may impose liability on brokers
for making an independent statement69 without actual knowledge
63. 488 N.E.2d 563 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985). In Richmond, the broker, relying upon
statements made to her by the seller, told the plaintiff that although the house exper-
ienced water seepage problems in the past, the problems had been corrected and the
house, after the closing, would be free of water leaks and seepage. Id. at 564-65. Her
statement turned out to be incorrect and the plaintiff sued the broker alleging both inten-
tional and negligent misrepresentation. Id. at 565.
64. Id at 566.
65. Id. at 566-67 (citing Sawyer Realty Group, Inc. v. Jarvis Corp., 432 N.E.2d 849,
852 (Ill. 1982)).
66. Id. at 567.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Note that in promulgating its duty of accuracy, the Richmond court made no
distinction between a broker's statements made as a conduit for a seller and a broker's
statements made independently. In fact, the Richmond court rejected the broker's con-
tention that, based upon Lyons v. Christ Episcopal Church, 389 N.E.2d 623 (Ill. App. Ct.
1979), she, as a mere conduit, owed no duty to the plaintiff to independently substantisatp
the seller's statements. Richmond, 488 N.Y. 9 at 516-67. Tite Richmond court, through
q,, ~ v'"Iuning oased only on a portion of the Lyons holding, held that Lyons was
not applicable because Lyons only addressed the issue of negligent misrepresentation
whereas the case before it involved both negligent misrepresentation and intentional mis-
representation. Id. at 566. It is unclear why the Lyons holding should not have applied
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of the statement's veracity. Moreover, this duty of accuracy,
breachable by making statements without actual knowledge of
their truth or falsity (as opposed to being breachable by making
statements that the broker knew or should have known70 to be
false), appears to impose upon brokers a stringent duty to discover,
investigate, and obtain actual knowledge prior to making any
statements.7
to the negligent misrepresentation elements of the Richmond case. Arguably, however,
without the Richmond court's express rejection of the Lyons holding, the Richmond deci-
sion should be read as consistent with the Lyons holding. Thus, after Richmond,
although brokers appear to have a stringent duty to be accurate and truthful in their
independent statements, they should still be afforded the protection of Lyons in a negli-
gent misrepresentation action and, when they act merely as a conduit for the seller,
should be afforded greater protection and should not have a duty of accuracy absent
knowledge of the seller's incorrect statement.
Note further, however, that Zimmerman v. Northfield Real Estate, Inc., 510 N.E.2d
409, 415 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986), differs from the Richmond decision because the Zimmer-
man court was unwilling, as was the Lyons court, to impose a duty of discovery when a
broker acts as a conduit unless, through the exercise of ordinary care, the broker had
reason to believe that the principal's statements were false. Indeed, the Zimmerman
court stated, "The misrepresentation may result from ... providing information which is
false .... [However, a] realtor has no duty to prospective buyers to independently sub-
stantiate the representations of a seller unless the realtor is aware of facts which tend to
indicate that such a representation is false." Id. at 414-15 (citing Lyons, 389 N.E.2d at
623).
70. See supra notes 49-52, infra note 93 and accompanying text.
71. The Richmond court's formulation of the duty of discovery as incorporated in the
duty of accuracy appears to be in conflict with both the Lyons holding and with dicta in
Munjal v. Baird & Warner, Inc., 485 N.E.2d 855 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985). In Munjal,
although the court initially held that the broker's false statement did not rise to the level
of fraud, the court went on to indicate that the broker's statement did not even rise to the
level of negligent misrepresentation. Id. at 864-65. Indeed, the Munjal court recognized
that the broker's statement was made without actual knowledge of its truth or falsity, and
stated:
in the absence of any case law to the contrary, we are unwilling to find a duty on
the part of a real estate broker to discover any latent material defects on property
which a seller has not disclosed to him prior to sale. To do so would place an
unwarranted burden on real estate brokers as a whole. Thus, we do not think
that defendants brokers, in this case, were obligated to make a full investigation
as to whether there was an actual flooding problem in the house without clear
evidence of same or without disclosure by the seller.
Id. at 864 (emphasis added). Thus, at least in dicta, the Munjal court would appear to
qualify the scope of the duty of accuracy by finding that it only incorporates a duty to
discover if a broker has knowledge, obtained either through disclosure by the seller or
through clear evidence of a latent material defect.
However, the Munjal court did not indicate what type of investigation and subsequent
disclosure would be required of the broker if the broker became aware of latent defects,
either by viewing clear evidence or by the seller's disclosure. In addition, if the broker
only becomes aware of a latent defect because of "clear evidence," such evidence should
be equally apparent to the purchaser and, therefore, the broker's obligation to make an
investigation or a disclosure should be limited if not completely eliminated. See, e.g.,
Posner v. Davis, 395 N.E.2d 133 (Il. App. Ct. 1979). In Posner, the court, deciding an
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After Richmond, the court in Zimmerman v. NorthfieldReal Es-
tate, Inc. 72 further addressed the scope of the duty of accuracy and
its inherent duty of discovery in the context of a negligent misrep-
resentation action. In Zimmerman, the plaintiffs alleged that the
brokers "had a duty to act with a reasonable degree of care to as-
certain, disclose and not conceal the material facts regarding the
lot size, flooding and other defects.' 3 Addressing the alleged du-
ties, the Zimmerman court, in language similar to the language of
section 552, observed that "[t]he test of negligent misrepresenta-
tion involves the breach of a duty to use due care in obtaining and
communicating information upon which others may reasonably be
expected to rely in the conduct of their economic affairs.""
If Zimmerman is read literally, it establishes that a broker has a
duty to use due care in "obtaining and communicating" informa-
tion which can be breached by providing information that is false.
Therefore, as a practical matter, the Zimmerman decision reaf-
firms both the Lyons and Richmond decisions and incorporates
within the duty of accuracy a duty of discovery. Indeed, if a bro-
ker is to satisfy the duty of accuracy, such a formulation imposes
upon a broker a duty of discovery or investigation sufficient to con-
firm the accuracy of the broker's statements.75 However, the ques-
action for fraud against the seller, adopted the following description of the seller's duty to
disclose:
"where the seller knows of facts materially affecting the value or desirability of
the property which are known or accessible only to him and also knows that
such facts are not known to or within the reach of the diligent attention and
observation of the buyer, the seller is under a duty to disclose them to the
buyer."
Id. at 137 (emphasis added) (quoting Lingsch v. Savage, 29 Cal. Rptr. 201, 204 (Ct. App.
1963)); see also Salisbury v. Chapman Realty, 465 N.E.2d 127, 132 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984)
("The question of whether the plaintiffs had a right to rely on [defendant's] silence...
must be answered in light of all of the facts of which the plaintiffs had actual knowledge
as well as those which they might have discovered by the exercise of ordinary pru-
dence."); Russow v. Bobola, 277 N.E.2d 769, 772 (Ill. App. Ct. 1972) ("[T]he plaintiffs
had a duty of inquiry regarding the premises and are chargeable with all knowledge
which an examination conducted with ordinary care would provide.")
72. 510 N.E.2d 409 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986).
73. Id. at 414.
74. Id. (emphasis added). For the text of § 552, see supra note 46.
75. Indeed, comment e to § 552 provides:
Since the rule of liability.., is based upon negligence, the defendant is subject
to liability if, but only if, he has failed to exercise the care or competence of a
reasonable man in obtaining or communicating the information. What is rea-
sonable is, as in nther ""_ cf e 4,,, ucpenaent upon the circumstances.
When the information concerns a fact not known to the recipient, he is enti-
tled to expect that the supplier will exercise that care and competence in its
ascertainment which the supplier's business or profession requires and which,
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tion after Zimmerman is whether the scope of the duty of
discovery is the less stringent one indicated in the Lyons holding
and by Munjal in dicta or the more stringent one promulgated in
Richmond.76
The First District Illinois Appellate Court, in Harkala v. Wild-
wood Realty, Inc.,77 took a step, at least in the context of a negli-
gent misrepresentation action,78 toward answering this question.
In Harkala, the plaintiffs purchased a home infested with ter-
mites.79 They alleged that by making broad, general statements
that the house was in "good condition" and "structurally sound,"
the defendant brokers were liable for negligent misrepresentation80
and for breaching a fiduciary duty.8' The plaintiffs' theory of lia-
bility for both actions was that the brokers had an obligation not
only to speak correctly, but also to investigate to ensure that their
statements were accurate.8 2 Consistent with Zimmerman, the
Harkala court acknowledged that "Illinois courts have adopted the
tort of negligent misrepresentation from the formulation of the Re-
statement (Second) of Torts. '8 3 Relying upon Zimmerman, the
Harkala court stated that the "test of negligent misrepresentation
involves the breach of a duty to use care in obtaining and commu-
nicating information upon which others reasonably may be ex-
pected to rely."8s4
However, even though the express representations by the bro-
kers were made independently and were false, 5 the Harkala court
affirmed the verdict for the brokers on the negligent misrepresenta-
therefore, the supplier professes to have by engaging in it. Thus the recipient is
entitled to expect that such investigations as are necessary will be carefully
made and that his informant will have normal business or professional compe-
tence to form an intelligent judgment upon the data obtained.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 cmt. e (1977) (citations omitted).
76. Lyons v. Christ Episcopal Church, 389 N.E.2d 623, 626 (I11. App. Ct. 1979); see
supra text accompanying notes 47-52; Munjal v. Baird & Warner, Inc., 485 N.E.2d 855,
864 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985); see supra note 71; Richmond v. Blair, 488 N.E.2d 563 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1985); see supra notes 70-71.
77. 558 N.E.2d 195 (I11. App. Ct. 1990).
78. For an examination of this question in the context of a fraudulent concealment
action, see the discussion of the Munjal decision, supra notes 30-38 and accompanying
text.
79. Harkala, 558 N.E.2d at 197.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 201.
83. Id. at 202.
84. Id. (emphasis added).
85. This fact alone arguably would make the brokers liable for negligent misrepresen-
tation pursuant to the Richmond holding. See supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text.
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tion action. 6 The court apparently held as it did because it found
that the brokers, absent knowledge of thespecific defect and absent
affirmative inquiry as to the specific defect, did not breach the duty
of accuracy either by making statements that ultimately proved to
be false or by failing to discover the specific defect."' Indeed, the
Harkala court stated:
no allegations were made, nor evidence of the brokers' knowledge
demonstrated, nor concealment of reports shown, nor specific
reassurances communicated to plaintiffs by the brokers.
The testimony adduced at trial here produced no evidence to
support the Harkalas' allegations that defendants knew or should
have known of the termites and their damage without tearing
down the walls and conducting tests. Nothing in the record indi-
cates that, in the absence of some reason to do so, the brokers
should have undertaken such action. We are unwilling to impose
that burden upon them under the facts of this case.s s
The Harkala holding may be seen as a synthesis of prior case
law concerning negligent misrepresentation. After Harkala, the
Lyons and Duhl decisions still stand for the respective propositions
that if a broker has knowledge of the falsity of a statement made as
a conduit,8 9 or if a broker affirmatively undertakes to provide infor-
86. Harkala, 558 N.E.2d at 203.
87. Id.
88. Id. (emphasis added). Moreover, the Harkala court found such a result to be
consistent with prior Illinois case law. Id. at 200.
In addition, in considering the plaintiffs' claim that the brokers breached a fiduciary
duty, the Harkala court held, based on Munjal, that a duty to discover latent material
defects "would place an unwarranted burden on brokers." Id. at 201. The Harkala court
found inapplicable several out-of-state decisions concerning negligent misrepresentation
actions that the plaintiffs relied upon. In fact, the court noted:
[The plaintiffs] cite several out of state decisions as authority for their posi-
tion, among them Hoffman v. Connall. There, the appellate court ruled that a
broker could be liable for making negligent misrepresentations to [a] buyer; how-
ever, this holding was later reversed by the Washington Supreme Court, which
found that a broker is not liable if the sellers give no indication that there is a
need to confirm the representations. In Bevins v. Ballard, the court held that,
under the theory of negligent misrepresentation, a duty arises when a broker
becomes aware of facts contrary to his representations or when a buyer makes
an affirmative inquiry and the broker fails to check the accuracy of his response
.... Finally, in Gouveia v. Citicorp Person-to-Person Financial Center, Inc.,
the court recognized that if a broker exercising reasonable care should have had
actual knowledge of defects in the property, he may be liable for negligent fail-
ure to discover and disclose them.
Id. (emphasis added) (citing HoffmA"- CzniaIl, 7i; r.2 814 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986),
;v;',, 736 P.md 242 (Wash. 1987); Bevins v. Ballard, 655 P.2d 757 (Alaska 1982);
Gouveia v. Citicorp Person-to-Person Fin. Ctr., Inc., 686 P.2d 262 (N.M. 1984)).
89. Lyons v. Christ Episcopal Church, 389 N.E.2d 623, 625 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979); see
supra text accompanying note 52.
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mation,90 then that broker has a duty of accuracy to the prospec-
tive purchaser. 91 In addition to these specific instances that create
a duty of accuracy upon a broker, all brokers have, pursuant to
Sawyer, a general duty of good faith which, pursuant to Richmond
and Zimmerman, includes the duty to use due care in obtaining
and communicating information even when making independent
statements.92
Moreover, as indicated by Lyons, Munjal, Richmond, Zimmer-
man, and Harkala, a duty of discovery is inherent in the duty of
accuracy. According to the Harkala court, the scope of the duty
of discovery is the less stringent one promulgated by the Lyons
court and indicated by Munjal in dicta.93 Indeed, the duty of accu-
racy can be breached only if: (1) a broker knew or should have
known' of conditions that make the broker's statements false; or
(2) the broker fails to obtain the knowledge necessary to confirm
the accuracy of the statements after specific inquiry from a pro-
spective purchaser. Thus, with respect to a broker's statements not
made in response to a specific inquiry of a purchaser, the duty of
discovery inherent in the duty of accuracy is the duty to use rea-
sonable diligence to ascertain the veracity of such statements.95
Further, with respect to a broker's statements made in response to
90. Duhl v. Nash Realty, Inc., 429 N.E.2d 1267, 1272-73 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981); see
supra text accompanying note 61.
91. Duhl, 429 N.E.2d at 1272-73; Lyons, 389 N.E.2d at 625; see supra notes 47-62
and accompanying text.
92. Sawyer Realty Group, Inc. v. Jarvis Corp., 432 N.E.2d 849, 852 (Ill. 1982); Zim-
merman v. Northfield Real Estate, Inc., 510 N.E.2d 409, 414-15 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986);
Richmond v. Blair, 488 N.E.2d 563, 567 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985); see supra notes 69-71, 73-75
and accompanying text.
93. Note that although the Harkala court found that the brokers' express statements
fell within the "conduit" exception in the Consumer Fraud Act, see infra notes 141-44
and accompanying text, the court did not expressly determine whether the brokers' state-
ments with respect to the negligent misrepresentation claim were made independently or
as a conduit. Thus, it is unclear whether the duty of discovery from Richmond, see supra
note 71 and accompanying text, still applies to a broker's independent statements.
94. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 12(2) (1977). Section 12(2) states:
The words "should know" are used throughout the Restatement of this Sub-
ject to denote the fact that a person of reasonable prudence and intelligence or
of the superior intelligence of the actor would ascertain the fact in question in
the performance of his duty to another, or would govern his conduct upon the
assumption that such fact exists.
Id. Comment a to § 12 further states:
"Should know" indicates that the actor is under a duty to another to use
reasonable diligence to ascertain the existence or non-existence of the fact in
question and that he would ascertain the existence thereof in the proper per-
formance of that duty.
Id. § 12 cmt. a.
95. Id. § 12.
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a specific inquiry by a purchaser, the duty of discovery is more
stringent and obligates the broker to investigate the property for
latent defects.
II. STATUTORY DUTIES OF DISCLOSURE AND ACCURACY
Section 2 of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Busi-
ness Practices Act ("Consumer Fraud Act") provides, in pertinent
part:
the use or employment of any deception, fraud, false pretense,
false promise, misrepresentation or the concealment, suppression
or omission of any material fact, with intent that others rely upon
the concealment, suppression or omission of such material fact,
or the use or employment of any practice described in Section 2
of the "Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act" . . . in the con-
duct of any trade or commerce are hereby declared unlawful
whether any person has in fact been misled, deceived or damaged
thereby. 96
As noted, the Consumer Fraud Act incorporates by reference the
Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act ("Uniform Act") 97 and
thus section 2 of the Uniform Act.98 Section 2 of the Uniform Act
provides that a deceptive practice occurs when a person "engages
in any other conduct which similarly creates a likelihood of confu-
sion or of misunderstanding," 99 although a plaintiff does not have
to prove "actual confusion or misunderstanding."00
Thus, a literal reading of the Consumer Fraud Act would im-
pose, regardless of actual reliance, a duty of accuracy that is nearly
absolute and a duty of disclosure that, if the requisite intent is
shown, is also nearly absolute. The initial cases construing the
Consumer Fraud Act interpreted it literally l01 However, poten-
tially influenced by a 1982 amendment to the Consumer Fraud Act
that essentially codified the less stringent common law,10 2 later
cases have been reluctant to follow a literal interpretation and have
avoided imposing liability under the Consumer Fraud Act absent
the existence of common law duties.
96. Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121
1/2, para. 262 (1989).
97. Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, para.
312(12) (1989).
98. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, para. 262 (1989); see supra note 4.
99. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121 1/2. nars. 1?(1") (Inon%
101. See infra notes 103-16 and accompanying text.
102. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, para. 270(b)(4) (1989); see infra text accompany-
ing note 133.
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One of the early cases to interpret the Consumer Fraud Act was
Beard v. Gress."0 3 In Beard, the plaintiffs alleged that the broker
incorrectly stated the interest rate in the mortgage assumed by
them, thereby violating the Consumer Fraud Act. 'I Finding the
Consumer Fraud Act applicable to real estate transactions, 05 the
Beard court held: "By the express terms of the section a misrepre-
sentation made by a broker for a party as to a material fact in a real
estate sale constitutes an actionable violation of the Consumer
Fraud Act."' 6 Moreover, relying upon prior case law, the Beard
court found "neither the mental state of the person making a mis-
representation nor the diligence of the injured party to check as to
the accuracy of the misrepresentation to be material to the exist-
ence of a cause of action for that misrepresentation under" the
Consumer Fraud Act.0 7 Thus, according to Beard, the Consumer
Fraud Act should be interpreted literally. Under such a literal
construction, a broker has potential liability for even an innocent
misrepresentation regardless of whether the broker has knowledge
of the falsity of the representation or whether the falsity is easily
discoverable by the purchaser.'
In Duhl v. Nash Realty, Inc. ,"o the court not only affirmed the
Beard decision but also noted the broad purpose behind the Con-
sumer Fraud Act supporting a strict, literal interpretation of the
Act. 110 Citing Beard, the Duhl court rejected the broker's assertion
that the plaintiff was required to allege intent to deceive and stated
that "it is well established that under the Act ... [intention] is not
103. 413 N.E.2d 448 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980).
104. Id. at 449.
105. Id. at 452. The Beard court, through questionable reasoning, concluded:
[Tihe broadened scope of section 2 now covers real estate transactions and per-
mits purchasers of real estate to sue for violations of that section even though
they still do not come within the definition of "consumers" set forth in the act.
Any other interpretation would give the obviously unintended result of protect-
ing businessmen who purchase real estate but giving no such protection to other
citizens who do so.
Id.
106. Id. at 451.
107. Id. at 452 (citing Grimes v. Adlesperger, 384 N.E.2d 537 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978)).
108. Id. But see Perkins v. Collette, 534 N.E.2d 1312 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989). Contrary
to a strict, literal interpretation of the Consumer Fraud Act, the Perkins court held that
in considering a cause of action for violation of the Consumer Fraud Act, it is a question
of fact whether "plaintiffs could have discovered [the alleged misrepresentations] ... by
merely reviewing local zoning or building ordinances" and as such the trial court improp-
erly dismissed the cause of action. Id. at 1317. For a discussion of other cases that
refused to follow a strict, literal interpretation of the Consumer Fraud Act, see infra
notes 117-46 and accompanying text.
109. 429 N.E.2d 1267 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981).
110. Id. at 1277.
1992]
Loyola University Law Journal
important and a plaintiff can recover under the Act for innocent
misrepresentations.""' The court noted that this holding was con-
sistent with the Illinois legislature's intent that the Consumer
Fraud Act be utilized "to the utmost degree in eradicating all
forms of deceptive and unfair business practices and [to] grant ap-
propriate remedies to injured parties."' 12
The court in Buzzard v. Bolger 1 3 further reaffirmed a literal in-
terpretation of the Consumer Fraud Act. The Buzzard court noted
that the "Consumer Fraud Act provides an even broader consumer
protection than does the common law action of fraud or negligent
misrepresentation since the Act also prohibits any 'deception' or
'false promise.' ""4 In Buzzard, the court found that although the
brokers' representations were "a mixture of opinion and promises
of future action" that could not be the basis of a negligent misrep-
resentation action, the representations nevertheless created a "like-
lihood of misunderstanding."" 5 Accordingly, the Buzzard court
held that such representations constituted "a deceptive trade prac-
tice as defined in Section 2 of the Uniform Act" and thus an ac-
tionable violation of the Consumer Fraud Act."16
However, in Munjal v. Baird & Warner, Inc.,"7 the court re-
fused to find the broker liable for a violation of the Consumer
Fraud Act for what the broker claimed was an innocent misrepre-
sentation. "I In Munjal, the defendant broker falsely stated, based
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. 453 N.E.2d 1129 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983).
114. Id. at 1132.
115. Id. at 1131. In Buzzard, the court stated:
the alleged material facts which were purported to be misrepresented were that
plaintiffs need not concern themselves with the condition of the property; that
in view of the fact that plaintiffs were applying for V.A. financing, they would
not be required to purchase the property unless the Veteran's Administration
appraisal was approved; and that any substantial material defects would be re-
quired to be repaired or replaced by the sellers. An additional alleged misrepre-
sentation was to the effect that the services of an attorney were not necessary for
plaintiffs' representation in connection with the purchase of the residence.
These representations are not representations of existing facts, rather they con-
stituted a mixture of opinion and promises of future action .... The allegations
... as they presently stand are insufficient to state a cause of action for negligent
misrepresentation.
Id.
116. Id. at 1132. But see Perkins v. Collette, 534 N.E.2d 1312, 1315 (Ill. App. Ct.
1989) (considering the defendant broker's contention that "the Act only annlip t m,'
r tatic of --at that the alleged misrepresentations of [the defendant]
were ones of law, not fact").
117. 485 N.E.2d 855 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985).
118. Id. at 864. The court noted the broad coverage of the Consumer Fraud Act and
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upon information provided by the seller, that the cause of base-
ment flooding was a leaky check valve on a sump pump.' 19 Yet,
the court refused to find that the broker's statement was a misrep-
resentation under the Consumer Fraud Act because the court was
unwilling "to find a real estate broker liable for latent or hidden
defects of which he had no prior knowledge."' 20 Thus, because it
refused to find a common law duty of accuracy absent knowledge
of latent defects, the Munjal court refused to find the broker liable
for a statutory violation of the Consumer Fraud Act. As such, the
Munjal decision parts with prior court decisions that gave a strict,
literal interpretation to the Act. By declining to examine the statu-
tory obligations of the Consumer Fraud Act absent common law
duties, the Munjal decision greatly vitiates the purported legislative
intent of the Consumer Fraud Act' 2' and provides the broker ad-
ded protection through the introduction of common law theories in
the consideration of statutory obligations.
Similarly, the court in Stefani v. Baird & Warner, Inc. 122 contin-
ued the erosion of a literal interpretation of the Consumer Fraud
Act by relying on the presence or absence of common law duties in
interpreting broker liability under the Act. In Stefani, the plain-
tiffs alleged that the broker violated section 2 of the Consumer
Fraud Act and section 2 of the Uniform Act by failing to disclose
that it had delivered to the seller a competitive bid by prospective
purchasers. 123
The Stefani court reversed the trial court's dismissal and held
that disposition of the count could not be made "in the absence of a
determination of whether an agency relationship existed."1 24 In
addition, the court stated in dicta that if a principal-agent relation-
ship existed between the broker and the plaintiff, it would then be-
come a factual question as to the broker's liability under the
Consumer Fraud and Uniform Acts. 125 Therefore, although mak-
ing its ruling post-Sawyer, the Stefani court intimated that a plain-
acknowledged that the Beard decision would hold a broker liable for even an innocent
misrepresentation. Id. Nevertheless, the Munjal court held that a latent defect undis-
closed to the broker could not form the basis of that broker's liability. Id.
119. Id. at 861.
120. Id. at 864.
121. See supra text accompanying note 112.
122. 510 N.E.2d 65 (Ill. App. Ct.), appeal denied, 515 N.E.2d 127 (Il. 1987).
123. Id. at 67.
124. Id. at 71.
125. Id. at 70-71. The factual questions would be: 1) whether the defendants con-
cealed their representations of the competitive purchasers "with the intention to deceive
under circumstances creating an opportunity and duty to speak" that violates § 2 of the
Consumer Fraud Act; and 2) whether the defendants' concealment "resulted in confusion
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tiff would be precluded from bringing a cause of action under the
Consumer Fraud Act for a broker's failure to disclose its represen-
tation of a competitive purchaser unless a principal-agent relation-
ship existed.
The Stefani court's reasoning, however, is contrary to the plain
language and purported legislative purpose of the Consumer Fraud
Act. The existence of a principal-agent relationship is irrelevant to
whether a material fact was concealed, suppressed, or omitted with
the intent that others rely upon such concealment, suppression, or
omission. Moreover, the existence of an agency relationship is
equally irrelevant to whether the failure to disclose the representa-
tion of a competitive purchaser was conduct that created a likeli-
hood of confusion or misunderstanding. Finally, the Stefani
court's holding that an actionable section 2 concealment or omis-
sion must be done with the intent to deceive at a time when there is
a duty to speak requires a plaintiff to prove common law fraud,
which is contrary to the purported legislative purpose of the Con-
sumer Fraud Act.126
Continuing the trend of Munjal and Stefani, the court in Selig-
man v. First National Investments, Inc. 121 again relied upon com-
mon law theories in interpreting the statutory obligations imposed
by the Consumer Fraud Act and furthered the erosion of a literal
interpretation of the Act. In Seligman, the plaintiff alleged that
one of the brokers failed to disclose: (1) that he was not the owner
of the property that the plaintiff sought to purchase; and (2) that
he was competing with the plaintiff to purchase the property from
the actual owner at a lower price, in violation of the Consumer
Fraud Act.' 28 Relying on Sawyer, the Seligman court held that
brokers have a common law "duty to exercise good faith and to
disclose any personal interest in property they list for sale."' 29 The
court then held that the logical extension of Sawyer is that the bro-
ker's failure to "disclose such self dealing... constitutes consumer
fraud"' 3 ° under the Consumer Fraud Act.
Unlike the Stefani court, the Seligman court did not require the
existence of a principal-agent relationship prior to a consideration
of the elements underlying an action under the Consumer Fraud
or misunderstanding" that violates § 2 of the Uniform Act and thus § 2 of the Consumer
Fraud Act. Id.
126. See supra text accompanying notes 111-12.
1... 1....... . , 5,57 App. Ci. i36 ).
128. Id. at 1058-59.
129. Id. at 1064.
130. Id.
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Act. Seligman did rely, however, upon the existence of the Sawyer
common law duty of disclosure to support its conclusion that the
defendants violated the Consumer Fraud Act.' 3' The Seligman
court correctly reasoned that if the plaintiff could prove common
law fraud, such fraudulent activity also would be a violation of the
Consumer Fraud Act. a2 However, like the Munjal and Stefani
courts, the Seligman court did not consider the language of the
Consumer Fraud Act until it examined the brokers' common law
obligations of accuracy and disclosure. Since the plain language of
the statute should control regardless of the existence of other statu-
tory or common law obligations, the analysis used by the above
courts deviates from a literal interpretation of the Consumer Fraud
Act.
During the pendency of Munjal, the Illinois legislature effec-
tively overruled the Beard decision by amending the Consumer
Fraud Act to prohibit liability for innocent misrepresentations.
The amendment specifies that the Consumer Fraud Act will not
apply to
communication of any false, misleading or deceptive information,
provided by the seller of real estate located in Illinois, by a real
estate salesman or broker licensed under "The Real Estate Bro-
ker License Act", unless the salesman or broker knows of the
false, misleading or deceptive character of such information. This
provision shall be effective as to any communication, whenever
occurring. 133
Through this amendment, the Illinois legislature effectively codi-
fied the common law duty expressed in Lyons that brokers, passing
along information provided by the seller, are not liable for misstate-
ments unless they have knowledge of the statement's falsity. 34
The courts that have interpreted this paragraph of the Consumer
Fraud Act, however, have been reluctant to limit its scope and may
have expanded its protections to statements made independently
by brokers.
Indeed, in Zimmerman v. Northfield Real Estate, Inc.,' 3 the
court broadly interpreted paragraph 270(b)(4) of the Consumer
Fraud Act and found that for a broker to be liable for a Consumer
131. Id.
132. See Duhl v. Nash Realty, Inc., 429 N.E.2d 1267, 1277 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981)
("Since the [Consumer Fraud Act] affords even broader consumer protection than does
the common law action of fraud, it is clear that plaintiffs suing under the [Consumer
Fraud Act] need not establish all of the elements of fraud.").
133. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, para. 270(b)(4) (1989) (emphasis added).
134. See supra text accompanying note 49.
135. 510 N.E.2d 409 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986).
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Fraud Act violation, the "broker must know of the false, mislead-
ing or deceptive character of the information he communicates."' 136
Although the court did not decide whether the plaintiff has to al-
lege knowledge,3 7 it nevertheless indicated that, contrary to the
express language, paragraph 270(b)(4) of the Consumer Fraud Act
does apply to all statements made by brokers, whether indepen-
dently or as a conduit.3
Contrary to Zimmerman, however, the court in Harkala v.
Wildwood Realty, Inc. ' 39 examined this issue and, although it too
was not required directly to decide the issue, agreed with the plain-
tiffs' literal interpretation of paragraph 270(b)(4).140 Nevertheless,
the Harkala court reached a conclusion that potentially affords
brokers the protection of paragraph 270(b)(4) for their independ-
ent statements.
In Harkala, the plaintiffs argued that paragraph 270(b)(4) of the
Consumer Fraud Act did not apply to the defendant brokers' state-
ments that the property was in "good condition" and "structurally
sound" because such statements were made independently of any
information provided by the seller.' 4' Although agreeing with the
literal interpretation of paragraph 270(b)(4), the court found that
the brokers should be afforded its protection because the sellers
concealed termite damage and such concealment "served to make
a sufficient, albeit non-verbal, misrepresentation so as to come within
the policy of the Act's provisions in this case." 142 Consequently,
although the Harkala court approved of a literal interpretation of
paragraph 270(b)(4), it construed the facts consistently with the
136. Id. at 417. The court did not limit its interpretation, however, to instances in
which a broker's statements are made as a conduit. Id.
137. Since the plaintiff's complaint alleged knowledge on the part of the brokers, the
Zimmerman court did not have to decide whether a plaintiff must allege knowledge in
connection with a broker's independent statements. Id. at 413.
138. Id at 417-18; see also Perkins v. Collette, 534 N.E.2d 1312 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989).
Considering a cause of action for violation of the Consumer Fraud Act against an indi-
vidual who was both the seller of the property and the broker who listed it for sale, the
Perkins court stated, noting Zimmerman, that in order for there to be a violation of the
Consumer Fraud Act, the "broker must have knowledge of the false, misleading, or de-
ceptive nature of the information he conveys." Id. at 1315. It is unclear, however,
whether the court found that 270(b)(4) of the Consumer Fraud Act applied because the
broker, who was also the seller, was, in making his statement, conveying information
"provided by the seller" or whether 270(b)(4) of the Consumer Fraud Act applied to
statements made independently by brokers.
139. 558 N.E.2d 195 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990).
140. Id. at 200.
141. Id.
142. Id.
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policy of the paragraph1 4 3 to find that the brokers' statements were
made as a conduit of the seller's non-verbal misrepresentation.'4
The court did not rule on the scope of paragraph 270(b)(4), how-
ever, because, consistent with Munjal, Stefani, and Seligman, the
Harkala court refused to examine the brokers' statutory obliga-
tions under the Consumer Fraud Act absent a corresponding com-
mon law duty.1 45 Indeed, the Harkala court affirmed the circuit
court's grant of the brokers' motion for summary judgment for vio-
lation of the Consumer Fraud Act stating:
Neither Munjal nor Lyons create a duty for realtors to undertake
an investigation for hidden or latent defects. We hold that in the
absence of any reason to do so, as in this case, there was no duty
imputable to defendant brokers that would have compelled them
to investigate plaintiffs' home for concealed impairment of its
structure.
The identification of duty is a matter of law to be determined by
the court; and, where an issue is solely one of law, as here, sum-
mary judgment is proper. "6
Thus, as in Munjal, Stefani, and possibly Seligman, the Harkala
court construed the Consumer Fraud Act contrary to the legisla-
tive intent to require the existence of a common law duty prior to a
consideration of the brokers' statutory obligations. Moreover,
both the Zimmerman and Harkala decisions may have further cir-
cumvented the Consumer Fraud Act by their indications that, even
if a court is to consider the broker's statutory obligations under the
Consumer Fraud Act, a literal interpretation, at least with respect
to paragraph 270(b)(4), either is not mandated, as in Zimmerman,
or mandated but easily circumvented, as in Harkala.
III. STATUS OF CURRENT LAW
To summarize, a broker may be liable to a prospective purchaser
either for silence or for incorrect express statements. Depending
upon the circumstances, a broker may be liable for silence pursuant
to both a common law action for fraudulent concealment and a
statutory action for violation of the Consumer Fraud Act.
Regarding the common law actions, the Sawyer, Munjal, and
Zimmerman decisions provide that a broker has a duty to disclose
143. Discussing the "policy" or intent of 270(b)(4) of the Consumer Fraud Act, the
Harkala court stated "[t]his is persuasive evidence that the Act was not intended to im-
pose liability upon a broker for latent or hidden defects." Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. (emphasis added).
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known material defects. However, a broker does not have a duty
to investigate to obtain knowledge of such material defects absent
clear evidence of or disclosure of the defects by the seller. Further,
in connection with the statutory action for broker omissions, if the
Illinois courts follow a literal interpretation of the Consumer
Fraud Act, a broker may violate the Act by either: (1) failing to
disclose a material fact with the intent that others rely upon the
omission; or (2) failing to disclose a material fact, the omission of
which creates a likelihood of confusion or misunderstanding.
In addition, a broker's express statements may impose liability
under both a common law action for negligent misrepresentation
and a statutory action for violation of the Consumer Fraud Act.
In connection with negligent misrepresentation actions, the Lyons,
Duhl, Richmond, Zimmerman, and Harkala decisions suggest
that, in addition to a general duty of accuracy, there are specific
duties of accuracy that arise out of special circumstances. These
specific duties of accuracy arise: (1) when a broker acts as a con-
duit for a seller's statements and the broker knows, or should have
known through the exercise of due care, that the seller's statement
is false; and (2) when a broker specifically undertakes an obligation
to provide information.
As previously discussed, the general duty of accuracy initially
arose out of the Sawyer duty of good faith and obligates a broker to
be knowledgeable and accurate in statements made independently
or as a conduit. The source of the general duty, however, eventu-
ally shifted from the Sawyer duty of good faith to the language of
section 552 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts and obligates a
broker to use due care in obtaining and communicating informa-
tion. This obligation potentially requires a broker to investigate or
at least confirm the accuracy of his or her statements.
The scope of the duty of discovery inherent in the duty of accu-
racy differs depending upon the circumstances of the statement. If
a broker makes an independent statement in response to a specific
inquiry from a prospective purchaser, Harkala imposes a stringent
duty of discovery that may require investigation for latent defects.
If a broker makes a statement that is not in response to a specific
inquiry, Harkala imposes a lesser duty of discovery that requires
the use of reasonable diligence to ascertain the veracity of the state-
ment. What is not clear after Harkala, however, is whether this
.... s , ....... Gf ,,, -- ,e,,, app-is uny to a broker's state-
ments made as a conduit.
Further, in connection with a statutory action for a broker's ex-
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press statements, the Munjal, Stefani, Zimmerman, Seligman, and
Harkala decisions illustrate that Illinois courts are reluctant to find
liability unless the broker's misrepresentation or statement was
made in violation of a common law duty. These cases stand in
contrast to a literal interpretation of the Consumer Fraud Act,
which would make brokers liable for misrepresentations of mate-
rial facts and statements that create a likelihood of confusion or
misunderstanding. In addition, consistent with their reluctance to
impose liability in accordance with a literal interpretation of the
Consumer Fraud Act, Illinois courts are willing to extend the lim-
ited protection afforded brokers under the Act when acting as con-
duits to situations in which they act independently.
IV. FUTURE DEVELOPMENT OF BROKER LIABILITY
A. Common Law Liability
During the past decade, Illinois courts shifted from the extreme
of the caveat emptor doctrine to almost strict liability and now have
returned to a middle ground. Such a shift in the courts' position
may reflect the Illinois legislature's removal of a private right of
action from the Real Estate License Act of 1983 and the legisla-
ture's efforts to afford brokers added protection, at least for state-
ments made as conduits, in the Consumer Fraud Act. Thus, unless
the Illinois legislature retracts its recent protective enactments, it is
unlikely that Illinois courts will impose more stringent obligations
on a broker. Rather, it is more likely that the Illinois courts will
continue to find reasons to limit the scope of section 552 and the
Sawyer duty of good faith. 47
Notwithstanding the general movement of Illinois courts to-
wards narrowing the scope of a broker's common law liability,
there is another theory of liability to which disappointed purchas-
ers may have access. If a broker's misrepresentation results in
physical harm rather than pecuniary loss, then the harmed pur-
chaser may seek to impose liability on the broker pursuant to sec-
tion 311 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts ("section 31 1"1).148
Section 311 is similar to section 552 in that it incorporates a duty
of discovery into the duty of accuracy. It is, however, dissimilar to
147. See Harkala, 558 N.E.2d at 200 (limiting the duty of accuracy contained in
§ 552); Munjal v. Baird & Warner, Inc., 485 N.E.2d 855, 864 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985) (limit-
ing the duty of disclosure contained in the Sawyer duty of good faith).
148. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 311 (1977). Section 311 provides:
(1) One who negligently gives false information to another is subject to liabil-
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section 552 since it imposes broader liability. 149 With respect to a
duty of discovery under section 311, a broker is required "to exer-
cise the care of a reasonable man under the circumstances to ascer-
tain the facts ...[and h]is negligence may consist of failure to
make a proper inspection or inquiry."150 With respect to a duty of
accuracy, section 311 requires brokers to exercise "the judgment of
a reasonable man in determining whether, in light of the discov-
ered facts, the information is accurate [and h]is negligence may
consist of failure ...after proper inquiry to recognize that the
information given is not accurate." 151 In addition, a broker is re-
quired to "exercise reasonable care to bring to the understanding of
the recipient of the information the knowledge which he has so
acquired" and his negligence may "consist[ ] in the lack of reason-
able care to furnish accurate information."''
52
Although section 311 is of benefit to a party who suffers physical
harm, it is also of benefit to all prospective purchasers because of
the existence of potential broker liability. For example, because a
broker can never know when his or her incorrect statements con-
cerning the absence of defective electrical wiring or flooding will be
reasonably relied upon by another who suffers physical harm
rather than pecuniary loss, the obligations imposed by section 311,
and not section 552, may control the broker's conduct. a5 3 Thus, if
a broker decides to make such statements, 15 4 the broker must exer-
ity for physical harm caused by action taken by the other in reasonable reliance
upon such information, where such harm results
(a) to the other, or
(b) to such third persons as the actor should expect to be put in peril by the
action taken.
(2) Such negligence may consist of failure to exercise reasonable care
(a) in ascertaining the accuracy of the information, or
(b) in the manner in which it is communicated.
Id.
149. Comment a to § 311 provides:
The rule stated in this Section represents a somewhat broader liability than the
rules stated as to liability for pecuniary loss resulting from negligent misrepre-
sentation, stated in § 552, to which reference should be made for comparison.
Id. § 311 cmt. a.
150. Id. § 311 cmt. d (emphasis added).
151. Id.
152. Id. § 311 cmt. e.
153. Of course, there will be brokers who decide that the risk of physical injury is
slight compared to the cost, not only of making a sufficient investigation to comply with
§ 311, but also of lost sales commissions. These brokers undoubtedly will forego struc-
turina their conduct around 8 311 and nossiblv even 8 552.
154. An option for all brokers, of course, is that they either: (1) do not make any
statements to prospective purchasers; or (2) if they do make statements, to qualify such
statements as to (a) their source-for example, the seller; or (b) their accuracy-for ex-
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cise reasonable care in making a proper inspection, in interpreting
the results of the inspection, and in communicating accurate
information.
B. Statutory Liability
In the past several years, the Illinois legislature has taken an
active role in limiting the statutory obligations of brokers and in
limiting the private enforcement of those obligations. A private
individual can no longer bring a cause of action under the Real
Estate License Act of 1983 or, arguably, a cause of action under
any of the common law theories of liability based upon the obliga-
tions contained in the Real Estate License Act.1" In addition, a
purchaser bringing an action under the Consumer Fraud Act can
no longer simply allege that the broker's statement was false, de-
ceptive, or misleading. Instead, the purchaser must now allege, at
least as to statements made by the broker as a conduit, that the
statements were false, deceptive, or misleading and that the broker
knew that such statements were false, deceptive, or misleading. By
requiring knowledge on the part of the broker for a violation of the
Consumer Fraud Act, the Illinois legislature is moving in a direc-
tion already initiated by the Illinois courts-that is, that there can
be no liability under the Consumer Fraud Act without a violation
of a common law duty. The Illinois legislature may follow the lead
of the Illinois courts and either further soften the interpretation of
the Consumer Fraud Act or, what would be more unlikely, prevent
its application to real estate transactions. 56
C. Recommendations
The expanded common law and statutory obligations imposed
on brokers were initiated to protect purchasers both from a bro-
ker's unscrupulous behavior that does not rise to the level of com-
mon law fraud and from the purchaser's own misplaced reliance on
ample, that the statement is the result of the broker's cursory inspection of the property
or that the statement is made without the broker's actual knowledge. In either event,
such statements should not be relied upon by prospective purchasers.
155. See Sawyer Realty Group, Inc. v. Jarvis Corp., 432 N.E.2d 849, 851-52 (Ill.
1982); supra notes 4, 17, 19, 43.
156. Although the Beard court's rationale in finding the Consumer Fraud Act appli-
cable to real estate transactions is questionable, see Beard v. Gress, 413 N.E.2d 448, 452
(I11. App. Ct. 1980); supra notes 103-08 and accompanying text, the Illinois legislature
implicitly confirmed such application when it specifically amended the Act to limit its
application only to a broker's statements made as a conduit, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121 1/2,
para. 270(b)(4) (1989); see relevant portion of amendment quoted supra text accompany-
ing note 133.
1992]
Loyola University Law Journal
brokers who have conflicting fiduciary obligations to their princi-
pals. Despite warnings to the contrary by brokers,1 57 purchasers
continue to assume incorrectly that brokers can divest themselves
of their fiduciary obligations to their principal and fully represent
the purchasers' interests in what is possibly the purchasers' most
expensive investment.1
5 8
Consumer education, not expanded common law and statutory
liability, is the appropriate solution for a purchaser's misplaced re-
liance. Regardless of the scope and severity of brokers' common
law and statutory obligations to prospective purchasers, brokers
will always have conflicting fiduciary obligations to their princi-
pals. The expansion of brokers' obligations to prospective purchas-
ers places brokers in the unenviable and unworkable situation of
serving two masters. Accordingly, there always will be situations
when brokers will act in accordance with their fiduciary obliga-
tions to their principals and adversely to prospective purchasers.
As a result, such purchasers may be harmed by their misplaced
reliance on brokers. Although a harmed purchaser will be able to
recover from the broker if the broker's obligations to the purchaser
are extensive and severe enough, such a result is not an appropriate
solution to misplaced reliance. Indeed, rather than removing the
cause of the purchaser's misplaced reliance, the increased common
law and statutory obligations perpetuate the purchaser's misplaced
reliance by allowing the purchaser redress for the harm suffered.
Instead, the appropriate solution for misplaced reliance is to ed-
ucate purchasers that there are independent sources upon which
they can and should rely in their purchase of property. First, pur-
chasers can rely upon the inspections of electricians, engineers, ar-
chitects, contractors, and other professionals regarding the
condition of the property. Second, purchasers can rely upon attor-
neys to insure that the purchase contract contains a contingency
that allows for a thorough inspection of all aspects of the property.
157. The Real Estate License Act of 1983 provides:
Persons licensed under this Act shall disclose in writing to prospective buyers
the existence of an agency relationship between the licensee and the seller, or
shall disclose in writing to sellers, or their agent, the existence of an agency
relationship between the licensee and a prospective buyer at a time and in a
manner consistent with regulations established by the Department.
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 111, para. 5818.2 (1989).
158. See, e.g., Lyons v. Christ Episcopal Church, 389 N.E.2d 623, 628 (Ill. App. Ct.
out to the public as having specialized knowledge with regard to housing, housing condi-
tions and related matters. The public is entitled to and does rely on the expertise of real
estate brokers in the purchase and sale of its homes.").
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Third, purchasers can rely on representations and warranties by
the seller that confirm the condition of the property or expose
problem areas that may necessitate further investigation. And fi-
nally, purchasers may be able to enter into an agreement with the
growing number of brokers willing to be "buyer brokers" who
work for and are compensated by, prospective purchasers.' 59
In addition to being inappropriate, the expanded statutory obli-
gations also are inefficient. The statutory obligations, and to a cer-
tain extent the expanded common law obligations, are inefficient
because brokers are not the cheapest and most efficient suppliers of
information."6 In fulfilling the obligations of discovery, disclo-
sure, and accuracy, a broker must be compensated not only for
time spent investigating a particular property, but also for the ex-
penses of any independent inspection service, as well as for the bro-
ker's increased liability risk. In contrast, a purchaser obtaining
adequate information about the property he or she seeks to
purchase only incurs the cost of a qualified independent inspection
service. That cost may be less than the broker's cost for an inspec-
tion because the purchaser is free to determine both the type and
scope of the inspection.
Further, the statutory obligations are inequitable because they
apply only to brokers and not to individual sellers.1 61 In essence,
these obligations allow a seller and a broker to make an identical
incorrect statement to a purchaser, and although neither of them
may be liable for negligent misrepresentation, if the statement is
made independently and relates to a material fact, the broker will
be liable for a statutory violation.
Finally, the statutory obligations are unwarranted. The ex-
panded common law protections, although themselves problematic
because they put brokers in the position of serving two masters, are
more than adequate to protect purchasers. If a broker fails to dis-
close a material defect, a purchaser can, based on Sawyer, bring
either a fraudulent concealment or a negligent misrepresentation
159. See For Some, Buyer Agents a Hard Sell, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 29, 1991, § 16, at 1.
160. But see, e.g., Note, Imposing Tort Liability on Real Estate Brokers Selling Defec-
tive Housing, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1861 867-71 (1986) (arguing that brokers are the most
efficient providers of housing information).
161. See Zimmerman v. Northfield Real Estate, Inc., 510 N.E.2d 409, 418 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1986) ("We find no support in Illinois law for the proposition that an individual
selling his own home is liable to a purchaser under the Consumer Fraud Act.... We
decline to extend the scope of the Consumer Fraud Act to individual sellers of single
family dwellings."). But see Grimes v. Adlesperger, 384 N.E.2d 537 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978)
(allowing a purchaser to rescind a sales contract because the vendor violated the Con-
sumer Fraud Act).
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action. And if a broker fails to accurately communicate material
information, a disappointed purchaser can, based upon Lyons,
Duhl, Sawyer, section 552, and potentially section 311 of the Re-
statement (Second) of Torts, bring a negligent misrepresentation ac-
tion. The common law theories present the most equitable method
for adequately protecting purchasers from unscrupulous broker be-
havior because they require proof of culpability.'62 Accordingly,
the protection provided by these common law theories makes it
unnecessary to impose strict and nearly absolute statutory obliga-
tions upon brokers.
V. CONCLUSION
The expanded common law and statutory obligations imposed
on brokers were initiated to protect purchasers from brokers' un-
scrupulous behavior and from their own misplaced assumptions
about the role of a broker in a real estate transaction. Although
unscrupulous behavior and purchaser reliance are both problems
that should be addressed, the current statutory obligations provide
an unwarranted and inappropriate response. Further, although the
expanded common law obligations are inadequate to address the
problem of a purchaser's misplaced reliance, they are the most eq-
uitable way to address the problem of unscrupulous broker con-
duct. Consequently, until further guidance from the Illinois
Supreme Court, purchaser reliance should be addressed through
consumer education and unscrupulous broker behavior should be
remedied by the current common law actions.
162. Although the expanded common law obligations are more equitable than the
statutory obligations, they too present a potential problem for the broker that, ironically,
arises out of the very latitude that makes them more equitable. As mentioned previously,
brokers are placed in the unenviable position of balancing their fiduciary obligations to
their principal-seller with their common law and statutory obligations to the prospective
purchaser. Such balancing means that the broker will be concerned about potential suits
by both a disappointed purchaser and a disappointed principal.
A disappointed principal may allege that the broker, in attempting to comply with
duties to the purchaser, discovered and disclosed more information than was necessary to
satisfy those duties and in doing so, breached a fiduciary obligation to obtain the highest
and best price for the principal's property. The broker, by doing more than is required,
may not be able to raise as a defense to a breach of duty to the principal the conflicting
duty to the purchaser. Thus, the broker may be iiaubi iu i1e principal i1 a blumcal U,
fiduciary duty. Notwithstanding this potential conflict, the expanded common law obli-
gations provide the most equitable and adequate means by which prospective purchasers
are protected from unscrupulous broker conduct.
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